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Abstract in English 
 
This paper examines the effects of experience rating on the inflow into disability insurance (DI) 
in the Netherlands, using unique longitudinal administrative data from the Dutch social benefit 
administration for the years 2000-2002. We follow a difference-in-differences approach to 
identify the impact of changes in DI premiums. In particular, due to unawareness of the 
experience rating system, employers seem to have been triggered to increase preventative 
activities, once they have experienced increases in DI premium (‘ex post incentives’). We find 
the impact of experience rating to be substantial, amounting to a 15% reduction of the inflow 
into DI. This finding is robust with respect to various alternative specification alternatives. We 
conclude that the decision of employers to increase preventative activities seems mainly an 
issue of being aware of the experience rating incentive.  
 
JEL Classification: H22, I12, C23 
Keywords: experience rating, disability insurance, panel data 
 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Dit Discussion Paper onderzoekt in hoeverre WAO-premiedifferentiatie in Nederland heeft 
geleid tot een vermindering van de WAO-instroom. Hiertoe is gebruik gemaakt van 
administratieve gegevens van het Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV) over 
de periode van 2000 tot en met 2002. Middels een ‘difference-in-difference’ benadering 
schatten we het effect van WAO-premiedifferentiatie – dat wil zeggen dat we onderzoeken of 
de WAO-instroom van werkgevers die geconfronteerd worden met premieverhogingen zich 
anders heeft ontwikkeld dan voor hen voor wie dat niet het geval is geweest. De 
schattingsresultaten duiden er op dat werkgevers na premieverhogingen als gevolg van 
premiedifferentiatie meer aan preventie zijn gaan doen en dat dit heeft geleid tot een 
vermindering van de WAO-instroom van 15% na één jaar. Dit resultaat is robuust ten aanzien 
van verschillende modelveronderstellingen.  
 
Steekwoorden: WAO, premiedifferentiatie, panel data 
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Summary in English 
As of 1998, disability insurance (DI) in the Netherlands is financed by premiums that are 
experience rated. This means that, in principle, employers bear the costs of the first five years of 
DI benefits. In this paper we have examined the effects of this system of experience rating, 
using a unique longitudinal administrative data set from the Dutch social benefit administration. 
This data set covers employers for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. This means that about 370 
thousand employers, employing roughly six million insured workers (about 75% of the working 
population in the Netherlands), are followed during these three years.  
 
Our analysis contributes to the empirical literature on experience rating in two aspects. First, we 
use longitudinal data, taking changes in movements of individual firms along premium 
schedules to be exogenous. This approach is similar to e.g. Anderson and Meyer (1994), who 
estimate the impact of experience rating on the incidence of unemployment insurance in the US. 
We follow a differences-in-differences approach to identify the impact of changes in premiums 
on the inflow into DI. Second, in our analysis we explicitly distinguish between ex ante and ex 
post effects of experience rating. Ex ante incentives arise if employers are aware of the 
incentive system and preventative actions have substantial impact. The identification of ex ante 
effects follows from the incompleteness of experience rating – that is, the marginal incentive to 
limit the inflow into disability is zero if a maximum premium is reached. Ex post effects of 
experience rating result from the unawareness of employers – i.e. unanticipated premium 
increases may trigger employers to increase preventative activities. In particular from the 
perspective of small and medium-sized firms, the experience rating system is complex, and is 
seemingly unimportant – as long as there is no inflow into DI. This seems particularly relevant 
for the first years of the experience rating system in the Netherlands. 
The overall picture that emerges from our empirical analysis is that the impact of experience 
rating on DI inflow has been substantial. This is in accordance with findings in other 
international studies. More strikingly, the decision of employers to increase preventative 
activities seems mainly an issue of being aware of the experience rating incentive. Employers 
seem to have been triggered to increase their preventative activities (‘ex post incentives’), once 
they have experienced (substantial) increases in their premium rates. In particular, we have 
estimated the ex post effect of the experience rating system to amount to a 15% reduction in the 
DI inflow after one year. We have shown that this finding is robust with respect to various 
specification alternatives. This confirms the idea that preventative activities are driven by ex 
post incentives, rather than responses that are in line with more accurate measures of financial 
incentives (ex ante incentives).  
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When taking a policy perspective, there are a number of options that follow from our analysis. 
First, an obvious policy option is to increase the awareness of employers of the experience 
rating system. To increase the awareness of the experience rating system, one may think of the 
provision of internet services and software options, so as to calculate the financial consequences 
of DI costs. Other policy options are related to the design of the experience rating system. In 
particular, restricting the experience rating incentive to partial DI schemes only does not seem a 
wise thing to do, as we find similar and substantial effects for the inflow into partial and full DI. 
In contrast to this, lowering the incentive for small employers – which in fact has been the case 
over the time period under consideration – is a more obvious policy option, since we found no 
substantial impact of the incentive for employers with less than 25 workers. This suggests that 
economies of scale in preventative activities are important.  
  9 
1  Introduction 
“To our experience, we continuously have to explain how the system of experience 
rating works. When mentioning the word, employers get a dazed look in the eyes.” 
(Van den Hauten, 2003, p. 258). 
 
As of 1998, disability insurance (DI) in the Netherlands is financed by premiums that are 
experience rated. This means that, in principle, employers bear the costs of the first five years of 
DI benefits. Initially, the experience rating system did not cause substantial controversy among 
employers and policy makers. It appears this has been due to the nature of the incentive system 
itself: each year, a new cohort of disability benefit costs has been added to the disability 
premium. In 2003 the experience rating incentive had reached its maximum impact. At the same 
time, criticism against the experience rating has grown steadily, as an increasing group of 
employers had been confronted with substantial increases in their premiums. The major 
argument of the opponents against experience rating – both employer organisations and 
politicians – is that employers, in particular those with small employer size, cannot be held 
responsible for (on average) about 31% of the DI costs of their employers.  
 
Empirical evidence on the effects of experience rating is limited. The most rigorous empirical 
analyses in this field are with respect to the US unemployment insurance (UI) system (see 
Meyer (2002) for a survey). Evaluations of experience rating for DI arrangements are even 
more scarce, and in the specific case of the Netherlands, virtually absent. In a way, this is not 
surprising: in the case of perfect experience rating, the (ex ante) incentive is equal for all 
employers – thus ruling out any variation that could potentially help to identify the impact. In 
practice, there is however a way to escape from this identification puzzle: experience rating 
systems are mostly incomplete, in the sense that premiums are bounded by minimum and/or 
maximum rates. This offers opportunities for the identification of incentive effects, as the 
(marginal) incentive will vary among employers. The empirical literature on UI experience 
rating largely relies upon this, as well as inter state variation in the design of experience rating.  
 
This paper examines the effects of experience rating on the inflow into DI in the Netherlands, 
using a unique longitudinal administrative data set from the Dutch social benefit administration. 
This data set covers employers for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. This means that about 370 
thousand employers, employing roughly six million insured workers (about 75% of the working 
population in the Netherlands), are followed during these three years. For each employer, we 
observe employer specific characteristics, the worker composition, as well as information on 
disability cohorts, the disability risk and the experience rated premium.  
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Our analysis contributes to the empirical literature on experience rating in two aspects. First, we 
use longitudinal data, taking changes in movements of individual firms along premium 
schedules to be exogenous. This approach is similar to e.g. Anderson and Meyer (1994), who 
estimate the impact of experience rating on the incidence of unemployment insurance in the US. 
We follow a differences-in-differences approach to identify the impact of changes in premiums 
on the inflow into DI. More specifically, we compare the DI inflow of employers that have 
experienced premium increases with those who have not. This is in contrast to most studies that 
examine the impact of experience rating, and where identification follows from (inter state) 
cross sectional variation in the data.  
 
Second, in our analysis we explicitly distinguish between ex ante and ex post effects of 
experience rating. Ex ante incentives arise if employers are aware of the incentive system and 
preventative actions have substantial impact. The identification of ex ante effects follows from 
the incompleteness of experience rating – that is, the marginal incentive to limit the inflow into 
disability is zero if a maximum premium is reached. In contrast to this, ex post effects of 
experience rating result from the unawareness of employers – that is, unanticipated premium 
increases may trigger employers to increase preventative activities. In particular from the 
perspective of small and medium-sized firms, the experience rating system is complex, and is 
seemingly unimportant – as long as there is no inflow into DI. This corresponds to e.g. Hyatt 
and Thomason (1998), who find the awareness of experience rating among individual firms to 
be limited. This seems particularly relevant for the first years of the experience rating system in 
the Netherlands. 
 
The paper proceeds by first presenting an overview of the evidence on experience rating, as 
well as briefly discussing some theory and its design. Section 3 describes the Dutch DI system, 
with particular attention to the premium system that was effective from 1998 to 2002 – the time 
period under consideration in the empirical analysis. In Section 4 we discuss the data. Section 5 
presents our estimation results, following estimation strategies that are based on cross sectional 
data first, and then taking advantage of the panel structure of the data. Section 6 concludes.  
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2  Experience rating: design and evidence 
2.1  Unemployment versus Disability Insurance  
Experience rating follows from the basic principle that employers may be given the discretion 
to their actions, provided that the corresponding costs are not imposed on other agents. Within 
the context of UI, this means that firms should pay for the societal costs of dismissals. As 
Blanchard and Tirole (2004) argue, these costs may even exceed the worker benefit level, if 
psychological and other costs borne by the worker are high, or in case of externalities – for 
example increases of crime rates in depressed areas. In practice, there are several strong reasons 
to abstract from the principle of full experience rating. Firms may be too fragile to handle large 
layoffs and the accompanying costs. This may result in extra layoffs (‘snowball effects’). A 
second complication is that employers may be triggered to evade taxes – employers may let 
their firms go bankrupt, so as to avoid further future layoff costs, and relocate new activities. 
Third, experience rating is likely to induce upward wage pressure by strengthening the position 
of workers, facing a less credible risk of becoming fired. On the whole, this results in higher 
unemployment. 
 
For the inflow into DI the design of experience rating comes with more or less similar 
arguments.
1 This means that there is no strong case for full experience rating of DI, just like 
there is no strong case for any experience rating at all. In addition to this, the arguments for the 
degree of experience rating for DI to be stronger or weaker that UI are mixed. From the 
perspective of the employer, the inflow into disability is – for an important part – driven by 
worker specific risks, whereas layoffs result from the decisions of employers. Thus, employers 
cannot be held responsible for the full disability risk, and the degree of experience rating 
therefore should be lower for DI than for UI. On the other hand – and in contrast to the DI risk – 
one should be aware that the unemployment risk cannot be (fully) insured by private insurers. In 
this respect, the government should be more cautious with the design of incentives for UI than 
for DI.  
2.2  The design of experience rating 
The optimal design of experience rating depends on a number of critical factors. Hyatt and 
Thomason (1998) list a number of issues that should be addressed: the problem of small 
employers, the appropriate measure of disability experience, the appropriate time window and 
the issue of prospective versus retrospective rating.  
 
1 Besseling et al. (1998) discuss the differences between DI and UI experience rating in more detail.  
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Small employers 
Employers have a limited ability to control the disability risk. This holds particularly true for 
small employers, who cannot rely upon the Law of Large Numbers. Therefore, the degree of 
experience rating should be lower for small employers. 
 
Measuring disability experience 
Which disability costs can best be attributed to the employer? In principle, all benefit costs can 
be treated as identical, and a fixed percentage can be passed on to the employer. This however 
is a rather crude measure of (incomplete) experience rating – incentives could be better targeted 
with information on the avoidability of costs. One way to do this is to distinguish between 
injury types. For some injury types, in particular those from workplace related accidents, 
preventative actions could have been effective, making the degree of experience rating to be set 
at a relatively high level. Another way to deal with this is to charge DI costs only over a certain 
time window – as is the case in the Netherlands.  
 
Time horizon 
In order to make incentives work, employers should have a sufficiently long time horizon. 
Activities to prevent disability, as well as to rehabilitate disabled workers, are time consuming 
and not immediately reflected in the experience rate. Moreover, there may be delays in the 
registration of disability costs. One way to deal with this is to use actuarial techniques to 
estimate the future DI costs. This will make employers more aware of the costs, and increase 
the responsiveness to (immediate) changes. The downside is that the accuracy of estimated 
future claims may be limited, in particular for small firms – causing the experience rating 
incentive to become less well targeted. 
Prospective versus retrospective rating 
Ideally, insurers have full information on the employer’s effort to prevent DI costs. Experience 
rating can then be fully prospective: the premium is based on the preventative plans the 
employer reveals, not the cost experience. Obviously, in real life, such a setting is not possible, 
but the system of experience rating – which departs from the idea that premiums are based on 
cost realisations – can be extended with prospective elements. For example, the employer can 
choose to invest more in prevention – in a way that can be verified by the insurer – thereby 
decreasing the extent of experience rating.
2  
 
2 The current experience rating system in the Netherlands is fully retrospective. This however does not mean that there are 
no prospective elements in the Dutch DI system at all. Employers have to meet working conditions requirements and make 
contracts with health and safety consultants.  
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2.3  Empirical evidence 
In order to measure the effect of experience rating on DI, there should be substantial variation 
in extent of experience rating among employers. Moreover, this variation should – at least to 
some extent – be exogenous to the disability risk. Clearly, creating a setting in which these 
conditions are met is a difficult task: one has to rely on policy changes over time, or 
(seemingly) arbitrary institutional variation in the design of experience rating (natural 
experiments). The rarity of such variation explains why research in this field is scarce, and – for 
an important part – based on indirect inference.
 In this respect, it seems the empirical literature 
on experience rating for UI is better developed than that for DI.
3 
 
Hyatt and Thomason (1998) survey the literature on DI experience rating for the US and 
Canada. They distinguish between studies describing the effects on the incidence of worker 
injuries, the severity of claims and the employers (preventative) activities. They conclude that 
experience rating is clearly associated with a reduction in the incidence of workplace injuries. 
At the extreme, the estimated impact can even amount to about 40% (see Bruce and Atkins, 
1993). Evidence of the effects on the severity of claims is however less convincing. This lends 
credence to the idea that, once an injury has occurred, employers have limited ability to 
rehabilitate workers. Finally, it seems that experience rating induces employers to appeal more 
often to workers’ compensations claims. This suggests that part of the reduction in the 
incidence rate is driven by more aggressive claims management by employers, next to increased 
preventative activities. In this respect, Hyatt and Thomason also stress the fact that the 
employer awareness of experience rating is limited. In particular, it seems that employers who 
become subject to the demerits of experience rating are most likely to become aware of the 
system. 
 
For the Netherlands, there is virtually no evidence on the impact of experience rating, either on 
the incidence or on the length of DI spells. Considering the literature that is somehow related to 
this issue, there are indications that the potential effect of experience rating is substantial. 
Empirical research on the size of hidden unemployment in DI suggests that the DI scheme has 
been used by employers as an exit route for residual workers. Hassink et al. (1997) find that 
about 10% of the DI inflow is due to redundancy of workers. A second strand of literature 
addresses the sickness behaviour of workers. Since the DI program follows after a period of 
absenteeism, it may well be that the effectiveness of preventative measures on absenteeism has 
important spillovers to DI. Following this line of research, using a panel of employer level data 
 
3 Since the seminal paper of Topel (1983), a number of empirical studies have appeared on the effects of experience rating 
on the UI incidence, all exploiting the US inter state variation in the incompleteness of experience rating. Meyer (2002) 
surveys the literature, and concludes that all studies find large effects of incomplete experience rating on lay-offs.  
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(the ZARA
4 employer panel), Besseling et al. (1999) find that – as a result of increases in 
financial incentives, including experience rating – employers have increased preventative 
activities. With the same data, Van Lomwel and Nelissen (2003) use a difference in difference-
methodology to investigate the effectiveness of these activities. They conclude that the short 
term impact equals about 10% of the absenteeism rate. This confirms the idea that there is a 
potential for experience rating to discourage the inflow into DI.  
 
 
4 ZARA = employer panel on absenteeism, working conditions, reintegration and disability.  
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3  Experience rating in the Netherlands 
3.1  The DI system 
In the Netherlands, the provision of DI is mandatory and financed by pay-as-you-go 
contribution rates. In principle, the program covers all workers against all incomes losses that 
result from injuries. This, combined with the public monopoly provision of DI, makes the 
disability determination system rather susceptible to moral hazard problems (see e.g. Aarts en 
de Jong, 2000). Public monopoly insurance has a record of minimising erroneous denials, at the 
cost of more erroneous admissions. Moral hazard problems are further aggravated by the 
generosity of the DI system, which is based on the individual earnings capacity.
5 This means 
that disability is measured as a percentage, rather than an all or nothing condition.
6  
 
Over the years, the Dutch DI program has repeatedly been subject of public debate. This is not 
surprising, as the DI enrolment in the Netherlands has remained high and persistent. Expressed 
as a percentage of the insured population, DI enrolment peaked at 16% in the mid eighties, and 
since then declined and stabilised at about 13%.
7 At the same time, various reform plans have 
been introduced.
 8 For an important part, these plans have aimed at improving employer 
incentives. To start with, the sickness benefit program has been (fully) privatised in 1996, 
making employers fully responsible for these costs. In 1998, employer’s incentives further have 
been enhanced by the system of DI experience rating.
9 Finally, in 2002, the (potential) impact 
of incentives was further extended by a more stringent system of gate keeping, and an extension 
of the sickness benefit period. In order to be eligible for a medical DI assessment both workers 
and employers have to meet several conditions, so as to convince the benefit administration that 
disability was unavoidable. 
 
Initially, the experience rating system did not cause substantial controversy among employers 
and policy makers. However, as the incentive became stronger, criticism against it has grown 
steadily. In 2003, the Dutch government responded to this by abolishing the experience rating 
system for employers with less than 25 employees. Still, criticism against experience rating has 
remained substantial and is one of the key issues in the current reform plans.  
 
 
5 The statutory replacement of DI benefit is set at 70%. In many collective agreements, statutory DI benefits are 
supplemented with non-statutory benefits, in particular in the first one or two years of benefit recipiency.   
6 Buddelmeyer (2001) extensively discusses the way the level of disability is determined in the Netherlands. 
7 See Buddelmeyer (2001) for a comparison of DI enrolment in the Netherlands with the US, UK, Germany and Sweden. 
8  In March 2004, the Dutch government has presented its most recent DI reform plans. The major ingredient of these plans 
will be the distinction between fully and permanently disabled, and partial and/or temporarily disabled. Benefit conditions for 
the partial disability program to be less generous, and a more prominent role for private insurers here.   
9 Next to the introduction of the experience rating system, employers were offered the opportunity to opt out.  
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3.2  The design of experience rating 
Basically, the calculation of premium consists of two steps: the determination of the disability 
risk and that of the disability premium. In both steps the exact calculation can be rather complex 
and experience rating may be incomplete. This does not only mean that the disability costs of 
the first five years of benefit years are not fully passed on, employers may also pay more than 
the costs involved, as we will show later on. 
3.2.1  The disability risk 
The calculation of the employer disability risk combines information on the disability costs of 
the first five worker cohorts and the (average) wage sum(s) over a five-year period. Both types 
of information are reported with a delay of two years. The disability risk dt of an employer at 
time t is calculated as the costs of the first five DI worker cohorts, divided by the average wage 
sum. Both the nominator and the denominator are registered with a delay of two years: 
 
                   ∑u=0
T  St-2, t-2-u  
(3.1)  dt    =     ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
           ∑u=0
T Wt-2-u  ⁄  ( T+ 1 ) 
 
where Sa ,b are the disability costs of an employer in year a for recipients that entered into the 




Averaging the wage sums over a time window of five years helps to diminish the effect of the 
volatility in wage sums.
11 Without averaging, a sudden drop in the wage sum in 2000 may cause 
the disability premium, which follows from the product of the risk in 2000 and the wage sum in 
2002, to be too high. At the same time, this way of smoothing also results in incompleteness of 
the experience rating system – that is, fast growing firms will cross-subsidise downsizing firms. 
To make this clear, we derive the marginal payment that follows from one extra euro of the total 
DI costs for a firm, with constant growth rate g (where the growth rate is corrected for a 
discount rate).
12 That is, we calculate the marginal incentive et as the derivative of the premium 
rate with respect to one extra euro of DI costs, and multiply this by the wage sum at time t: 
 
10 Due to calendar time effects, in practice some part of the disability costs of the cohort of t – 7 can also be included in this 
expression.  
11 In some cases, the information that is needed to calculate the disability risk may be incomplete. This may occur when 
employers have started their businesses recently, or when for some period there are no workers at a particular firm. This 
means that the disability risk has to be calculated over less than five years, but rescaled to a five year period. 
12 Under the assumption that the wage sum has a constant yearly growth rate, it is easy to see that Wt  cancels out of the 
expression.  
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                ∂  dt       ( 1 + g  )
6   ×  g × 5 
(3.2)  et    =   Wt    ×      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿        =   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
         ∂  ∑u=0
T St-2, t-2-u                    (1 + g )
5
   –  1 
 
For g close to zero, et can be approximated by 1+4g.
13 This means that cross subsidisation 
between firms is modest and equal to 4g. For larger growth rates however, the impact of 
smoothing can be substantial. For example, suppose a yearly growth rate of the wage sum of a 
firm of 25%. Then, the resulting marginal incentive equals 2.3, implying that about 232% of the 
marginal costs are passed on to the employer. Similarly, if we would assume the yearly growth 
rate to be negative, say – 20%, then the marginal incentive would equal 0.39, implying that only 
39% of the disability costs is passed on to the employer. 
3.2.2  The premium rate 
Each year, the social benefit administration estimates the average premium that is needed to 
compensate for the expected costs for the first five DI benefit cohorts. The calculation of this 
average premium is also an important parameter for the calculation of the differentiated 
premiums. Basically, the individual premium is calculated as 
 
(3.3)   pt    =  min ( pmin  +  dt  ,   pmax ) 
   
where pt is the premium rate, and pmin and pmax the minimum and maximum premiums – 
indicating the range over which pt may vary.  
 
Note that the minimum premium is in fact a uniform premium that is paid by all employers, also 
for dt = 0. Furthermore, it should be noted that the values for both pmin and pmax are different for 
small firms on the one hand, and medium sized and large firms on the other hand. In particular, 
if the wage sum in t exceeds 15 times the average wage sum across all employers, then pmin is 
set lower, and pmax higher, thus extending the support of premiums. For large firms, the 
maximum premium is set equal at four times the average premium, whereas that for small firms 
is three times the average premium. Next, the minimum premiums are set at the level that 
balances the disability costs with the collected premiums. This has to be done iteratively, as, 
due to increases in the minimum more premiums will be bounded by the maximum.
14 Since 
premiums of small firms have a higher probability to be bounded by the maximum, the 
minimum premium is higher for small firms. 
 
13 For small growth rates, the wage sum growth can be approximated by a linear function. Thus, the average wage sum then 
equals the third year of the five year time window. This, together with the two year delay, implies that the total delay equals 
four years. Thus, the disability risk is overestimated with 4  x g % . 
14 Apart from that, minimum premium revenues are also needed to finance the disability costs of firms that have gone 
bankrupt, or to make up past reserve deficits  
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3.2.3  The initial phase of the system 
In the first five years – from 1998 to 2003 – the experience rating system has gradually been 
brought into force. This means that the average premium first was based on the DI costs of new 
DI cohorts in 1998, and extended with an additional cohort in the subsequent years. 
Accordingly, the maximum and minimum premium rates have increased over time. However – 
and in contrast to this – as early as the introduction of experience rating in 1998, the calculation 
of the disability risk has been based on a five year time window. Thus, the individual disability 
risks had to be adjusted to match them with the premium rates.
15 
  
To sum up, the experience rating system gives a clear incentive for employers to decrease their 
DI costs, as it covers an important part of those DI costs.
16 Still, this does not mean that 
incentives have been strong for all employers at all time periods. First, due to the gradual 
introduction of the system, incentives were only modest in the first years. Second, the way the 
disability risk is calculated accommodates cross subsidies from (fast) growing to downsizing 
firms. And third, similar cross subsidies (still) exist from high risk to low risk employers.  
 
15 For example, for 1998 the adjustment rate was 0.20, and in 2001 it equalled 0.83.  
16 In 1998, the costs of the first five years of the DI program were estimated at 37% (Van Sonsbeek and Schepers, 2001).  
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4  Data 
4.1  Registered data 
The data set we use combines yearly information of all employers in three administration 
systems of UWV, the Dutch social benefit administration for 2000-2002. First, we have all 
registered information that is needed for the calculation of disability risks and premium rates. 
Second, we have (limited) worker information (like age and gender) that can be aggregated to 
the level of employers. Here, it should be noted that – in the current setup of the data – 
individual workers are not followed over time. Thus, in the estimation we cannot allow for 
individual worker specific effects. Third, data are derived from the social security records, 
containing information on the DI benefit recipients for various cohorts, as well as the inflow 
into DI. This also includes the inflow into the DI program. 
 
We have merged these three administration systems using employer codes, resulting in a panel 
data set of about 370 thousand employers, employing roughly six million workers. Table 4.1 
summarises some of the characteristics of this data set. To start with, it is important to note that 
– despite the fact that DI is mandatory – the data set does not cover all employers and workers 
in the Netherlands. In particular, experience rated premium rates cannot be calculated for firms 
that exist for less than one year, or firms that have merged or split up in several establishments 
recently. This induces some variation in the number of employers that is observed in the data 
over time, as well as the number of employees. 
 
Table 4.1 shows that the impact of experience rating has increased in the time period under 
consideration.
17 This increase is most prominent in terms of the number of benefit recipients 
that has been assigned to employers (from 1.5 to 2.6% of the working population). In terms of 
the DI risk rates, the increase is less pronounced (from 1.2% tot 1.4%). This is not surprising, as 
the risk measures are rescaled to a five year window if information is incomplete. Finally, we 
see that the premium rates have increased gradually, from 1.4% to 1.6% of the wage sum. 
 
 
17 Note that the number of employers that has opted out is not reported in the table. In 2002, this constituted about 2% of the 
sample. We assume that this group has similar incentives as those employers paying less than the maximum premium rate 
(with a marginal incentive equal to one).  
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Table 4.1    Employer characteristics: total and selected sample  
                Full sample                Selected sample 
  2000  2001  2002  2000  2001  2002 
             
# Employers  309174  315314  312656  66063  66063  66063 
Number of employees  6524458  6972086  6922609  5181148  5470448  5462871 
Average employer size  21.1  22.1  22.1  78.4  82.8  82.7 
             
Sectors (%)             
Primary sector  6.2  5.9  5.9  3.9  3.9  3.9 
Industrial sector  21.3  21.3  21.4  28.6  28.6  28.6 
Trade sector  28.1  27.6  26.8  21.0  21.0  21.0 
Service industries  3.3  3.4  3.5  5.1  5.1  5.1 
Transport   3.3  3.3  3.3  4.8  4.8  4.8 
Catering  8.2  8.3  8.3  7.6  7.6  7.6 
Social services / cultural  12.7  12.5  12.5  10.3  10.3  10.3 
(Semi-)public  1.6  1.6  1.5  5.4  5.4  5.4 
Financial sector  13.9  14.7  15.3  11.3  11.3  11.3 
Temp. empl. agencies  0.8  0.7  0.7  1.1  1.1  1.1 
Unknown  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7 
             
Age and gender (%)             
15-25   23.6  23.3  23.2  22.5  21.9  21.4 
26-35   32.3  31.5  30.3  31.6  30.5  29.0 
36-45   22.0  22.5  23.1  23.2  23.7  24.3 
46-55   16.6  16.7  17.1  17.4  18.0  18.7 
56-65   5.6  6.0  6.5  5.4  6.0  6.6 
Male  56.1  56.3  56.1  62.4  62.1  61.7 
Female   43.9  43.7  43.9  37.7  37.9  38.3 
           
Experience rating variables            
Average wage sum  34983  –  –  41319  –  – 
Disability risk (%)  1.18  1.37  1.35  1.29  1.48  1.69 
DI premium (%)  1.39  1.51  1.56  1.52  1.57  2.01 
pmin – pmax,  small empl.  1.24 – 4.17  0.98 – 4.77  1.24 – 6.06  1.24 – 4.17  0.98 – 4.77  1.24 – 6.06 
pmin – pmax,  large empl.  0.67 – 5.56  0.41 – 6.36  0.45 – 8.08  0.67 – 5.56  0.41 – 6.36  0.45 – 8.08 
% pmin  86.2  84.5  83.2  55.6  51.7  47.7 
% pmax  5.1  4.9  4.5  2.8  5.4  8.3 
% between pmin  and pmax  8.7  10.7  12.2  41.5  43.0  44.0 
         
Disabled workers as % of employer size         
Total  1.52  2.31  2.63  1.74  2.94  4.07 
- Male   1.03  1.28  1.40  1.24  1.73  2.28 
- Female  0.48  1.04  1.24  0.50  1.21  1.79 
             
Inflow into DI (%)             
Total  0.99  1.01  0.94  1.10  1.08  1.05 
- Male   0.49  0.51  0.48  0.60  0.60  0.56 
- Female  0.50  0.50  0.46  0.50  0.48  0.49 
- Fully disabled  0.30  0.36  0.34  0.40  0.46  0.44 
- Partially disabled  0.69  0.65  0.60  0.70  0.62  0.61 
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The inflow rate into DI can be derived from the inflow variable, together with the employer 
size.
18 This rate equals about 1.0% of the working population.
19 Moreover, the inflow consists 
for about 50% of female workers, indicating that the individual inflow rate is somewhat higher 
for women (as they make up about 44% of the working population). Finally, in the time period 
under consideration, the inflow rate into full disability has increased slightly, whereas the 
opposite holds for the inflow into partial disability. 
 
Some of the DI inflow is measured with a delay – causing the observed inflow into DI to be 
susceptive to measurement errors. In particular, when the DI spell of new recipients starts at the 
end of 2000, the assignment to a specific employer can take place in 2001. This measurement 
problem is limited to small employers. Therefore, in the empirical analysis, we select employers 
with at least ten employees. This reduces our sample size substantially – about 80% of the 
employer population is left out – but, in terms of the number of workers, the loss is only about 
20%. In order to construct a panel that is balanced, we also select employers that are observed 
for all relevant years. As a result, the proportion of sectors with small employers – such as the 
trade sector and the primary sector – decreases, as well as sectors where firm turnover is high.  
4.2  Experience rating dynamics 
Table 4.2 provides some more detailed summary statistics on the dynamics of the experience 
rating system. Here, we distinguish between three employer types: (i) employers with small 
employer size, for which the maximum premium equals three times the average premium; (2) 
employers with no more than 100 employees, for which the maximum premium equals four 
times the average premium; and (3) employers having similar experience rating parameters, 




18 Additionally, the DI outflow rate can also be derived from the cohorts of benefit recipients, but this is accompanied by 
measurement errors – in particular in the first year of benefit recipiency. Moreover, we do not have information on the exact 
destination following the DI spell. 
19  This rate is averaged over employers, not employees. As the inflow rate is somewhat lower for smaller firms than for 
medium sized and large firms, the resulting average is lower than the employee average.  
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Table 4.2  Transitions within the experience rating system; selected sample, 2000-2001 
2000  2001 
         
Small employer size          pmin   = 0.98%   pmin < .. < pmax  pmax   = 4.77%  total 
pmin   = 1.24%    8027  300  193  8520 
pmin < .. < pmax  169  338  192  699 
pmax   = 4.17%             75     66     537      678 
  8271  704  922  10076 
         
Medium sized employers (N<100)  pmin   = 0.41%   pmin < .. < pmax  pmax   = 6.36%   
pmin   = 0.67%  20555  4068  217  24840 
pmin < .. < pmax  2537  16050  1300  19877 
pmax   = 5.56%        46      264     683       993 
  23138  20382  2200  45583 
         
Large employer size (N>99)  pmin   = 0.41%   pmin < .. < pmax  pmax   = 6.36%   
pmin   = 0.67%  511  731  6  1248 
pmin < .. < pmax  170  6093  95  6358 
pmax   = 5.56%        0       24     10       34 
  681  6848  111  7640 
 
The vast majority of small employers in the sample has no DI costs that can be assigned to 
them, paying the minimum premium. Over time, we see that this group has decreased only 
slightly, indicating that the risk of premium increases is limited. At the same time, the number 
of employers paying the maximum premium has increased to the same extent. Obviously, this 
pattern would be far more prominent for the full sample, also including employers with less 
than 10 workers. For this group the DI costs of a benefit recipient constitute an important part of 
the wage costs – thus making it more likely that the maximum premium will be reached. For 
medium sized employers the picture becomes more dispersed – i.e. there is a higher probability 
of paying a premium between the minimum and maximum rate. Comparing the premium rates 
for 2000 and 2001, we also see that the probability of moving along the premium schedule is 
larger than for small employers. Still, we still find more than half of the employers paying the 
minimum premium. The likelihood of paying the minimum premium – just as the maximum – 
is very small for large employers.  
 
4.3  Measuring the marginal incentive 
In equation (3.2) we have calculated the experience rating incentive measure assuming a 
constant growth rate for the wage sum. As a result, the marginal incentive of an extra euro of DI 
costs was constant over time and over the various benefit cohorts. Given the data at hand, this 
equation now can be generalised by allowing for the growth rate to vary over time – thus 
inducing the marginal incentive for the specific cohort years to be time dependent. This means 
that the marginal incentive can now be calculated as a (discounted) weighted average over a 
time period of five consecutive years of DI costs:  
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            ∑c=0
T   ψ 
c  et , c  
(4.1)  et   =  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
                ∑c=0
T  ψ 
c    
 
with T = 4 and et , c representing the expected marginal incentive of DI costs in the c+1
th year of 
benefit recipiency. Discounting occurs at rate ψ.  The marginal incentive for the c+1
th  year of 
benefit recipiency is calculated as the derivative of the (future) disability risk dt+c with respect 
to the future disability costs in the c+1
th  year, multiplied by the wage sum in the c+1
th   year of 
benefit recipiency: 
               ∂  dt+c         Wt+2+c 
(4.2)   et , c  =  Wt+2+c   ￿￿￿￿￿￿  =   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
             ∂ St-2, t-2        ∑u=0
T  Wt+c-u  ⁄  ( T+ 1 ) 
 
with c = 0,.. T. 
 
Note that for a constant growth rate of the wage sum, we obtain the same expression as in 
equation (3.2), and the marginal incentive for the separate years of benefit recipiency are all 
equal. Furthermore, equation (4.2) makes apparent that, in order to determine et , we need 
information on the past and future values of W.
20 Thus, we have calculated sector specific 
(average) growth rates to extrapolate expected future values of W. Further, we set ψ equal to 
85%, corresponding to a yearly discount rate of 15%.
21 
 
20 Again, note that, due to the delay in the administrative system,  in the sample wage sums are observed up to 2000. In 
order to obtain observations for 2001 and onwards, we extrapolated the wage sums for subsequent years by using the 
average sector specific wage sum growth rates for 1998-2000. These average growth rates were calculated on the basis of 
two-digit-sectoral information (at about 70 sectors in total).  
21 Within the context of the experience rating system, the discount rate consists of the real interest rate, together with the exit 
rate out of DI. The real interest rate is set equal to 5%, and the average exit rate is set equal to 10%.  
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Table 4.3    Marginal incentives, average per sector in 2001 (standard deviations between brackets) 
Sector  Pr ( p < pmax )  %∆ wage sum  e t   × Pr (p < pmax) 
 the average marginal incentive 
       
Primary sector  91.6  4.5  0.813    (0.163) 
Industrial sector  94.4  5.4  0.967   (0.141) 
Trade sector  94.2  6.4  0.980   (0.200) 
Service industries  90.3  7.5  1.042   (0.252) 
Transport   95.2  6.1  0.972   (0.177) 
Catering  93.4  6.1  0.984   (0.190) 
Social services / cultural  93.3  7.8  1.041   (0.177) 
(semi-)public  95.7  4.7  0.966   (0.147) 
Financial sector  96.5  8.5  1.020   (0.282) 
Temporary employment agencies  93.5  5.5  0.985   (0.271) 
Unknown  94.5  7.6  1.016   (0.092) 
       
Total  94.7  6.4  0.983   (0.197) 
 
Table 4.3 provides summary statistics on the resulting marginal incentive measures, averaged 
over sectors. The first column of the table – expressing the percentage of employers with p < 
pmax  – shows that only a small fraction of the sample consists of employers for whom the 
marginal incentive is equal to zero. Not surprisingly, this is most likely to occur in sectors with 
small employer size, such as the primary sector and service industries. The third column of the 
table represents the sectoral (average) marginal incentive, multiplied by the probability of p < 
pmax . Here we find employers in sectors with (on average) high wage sum growth rates  –  such 
as the service and the financial sector – to pay more than 100% of their (additional) DI costs – 
thus cross-subsidising e.g. employers in the primary sector. 
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5  Empirical strategy and estimation results 
5.1  Identification issues 
In the empirical literature, the identification of incentive effects of experience rating is typically 
built on three major assumptions:  
 
·  Exogeneity in marginal incentive variation   
·  Local linearity of the incentive system 
·  Rationality of employers, who are fully aware of the experience rating system.  
 
First, and as argued in the previous sections, it is assumed that variation in the marginal 
experience incentive is – at least to some extent – exogenous. Exogeneity may arise in the case 
of (inter state) variation in the experience rating systems – such as the UI programs in the US, 
where the degree of completeness of experience rating varies between states. For the 
Netherlands, such an approach is not applicable, since the only institutional variation comes 
from the distinction between small employers and medium and large employers. Exogeneity 
can also be derived from variation in the experience rating incentive over time, using 
longitudinal employer data. Identification then follows from movements along tax or premium 
schedules. Anderson and Meyer (1994) use this approach, so as to provide first difference 
estimates of the impact of UI experience rating.  
  
Second, the local linearity assumption is needed to ensure that employer decisions are driven by 
the current marginal incentive. Stated differently, the incentive the employer is faced with is 
well approximated by the slope that determines how the employer’s costs would change in case 
of a small one-time increase in DI costs. For the US system of the UI program, the local 
linearity assumption does not seem too restrictive. In most states benefit exhaustion occurs after 
26 weeks of unemployment, whereas the marginal incentive changes on a yearly basis. 
However, for programs with a longer time horizon – such as the Dutch DI system – the relevant 
marginal incentive may change over time, thereby invalidating the local linearity assumption.  
  
Third, empirical evidence on the effects of experience rating is mostly based on variation in ex 
ante incentives. The presence of such effects – in particular for the UI system – suggests that 
employers are fully aware of the experience rating system and its incentives. Thus, the 
(implicit) assumption is that employers are driven by ex ante incentives, not ex post. Again, for 
the Dutch DI system, it can be argued that this assumption is too restrictive. The five year time 
window of DI benefits makes the experience rating system rather complex. In the time span 
covered by our analysis the system was introduced only recently, the vast majority of employers  
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having no DI costs and paying the uniform (minimum) premium rate. Therefore, it may well be 
that the ex ante incentive – in particular for small and medium sized employers –  was limited.  
5.2  Empirical strategy and implementation 
Estimating the effect of experience rating using standard techniques is likely to result in severe 
estimation biases. In order to show this, let us start by specifying the probability that worker i of 
employer j enters into the DI program at time t , using the familiar Logit specification: 
 




            exp [ X jt β  +  γ I ( pjt  <  pmax, jt )  +  αj  ]    
(5.2)    Pr ( DIijt =  1 )    =  ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
          1 + exp [ X jt β  +  γ I ( pjt  <  pmax, jt )  +  αj  ]   
 
where DIijt  =  1 if the individual enters into the DI program, and 0 otherwise. Further, X denotes 
employer specific characteristics and I is an indicator function denoting the event between 
parentheses. β is a vector of parameters describing the effect of X, and γ denotes the impact of 
the (ex ante) experience rating incentive. αj is a fixed component of the error term that captures 
permanent firm characteristics that affect the DI inflow probability. Finally, εijt denotes the error 
component. 
 
As I ( p jt < p max, jt)  is a function of past DI inflow (with a delay of two years), it can easily be 
shown that the marginal incentive of experience rating is correlated with αj , thus resulting in 
biased estimates of γ. Given the data at hand, there are two main empirical strategies to correct 
for this. The first approach is to exploit the (cross sectional) variation in the experience rating 
schedule for different employer types. The assumption that this variation is exogenous is too 
restrictive, but there is valuable information on past DI costs that can be used as control 
variables. In the second estimation approach, we exploit the panel character of the employer 
data, taking changes in the premium schedule to be exogenous. If ex ante effects are important, 
we would expect the inflow into DI to increase if an employer jumps up to the maximum 
premium, having no (marginal) incentive. Ex post effects are particularly relevant for employers 
without DI costs, paying the minimum, uniform premium, and are subsequently confronted with 
(partially) unanticipated raises in the premium. .   
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5.3  Cross sectional estimation results 
The first strategy to estimate the impact of experience rating is to include control variables for 
the worker specific effect, leaving us with variation in the incentive that is due to institutional 
variation. An obvious candidate for this is the observed DI risk of employers djt , which is 
needed to calculate the premium rate. We may expect the DI inflow probability to be an 
increasing function in djt , as this variable is an overall summary of the past DI inflow 
probabilities – hence approximating the employer specific effects. Due to the institutional setup 
of the experience rating system, we would expect the inflow probability to have an upward 
jump if the risk equals pmax– pmin. Thus, equation (5.2) can be rewritten as: 
 
            exp [ Xjt β  +  γ I ( pjt  <  pmax, jt )  +  f ( djt ) ]     
(5.3)  Pr ( DIijt =  1 )    =  ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
         1 + exp [ Xjt β  +  γ I ( pjt  <  pmax, jt )  +  f ( djt ) ]   
 
where f denotes a spline function of the DI risk percentage of an employer. Further, the 
assumption that is needed for identification – djt is an appropriate control for αj – can be 
formulated as: 
 
(5.4)  E ( I ( pjt  <  pmax, jt )  |  αj , djt )   =  E ( pjt  <  pmax, jt )  |  djt ). 
 
Now, if f  is sufficiently flexible, we have two sources of identifying variation for the incentive 
effect.
22 First, under the assumption that the local linearity assumption holds, the effect is 
identified by the discrete jump at the point of support where dt = pmax – pmin. Second, premium 
schedules are different for small and medium/large employers. For some part of the support of 
the disability risks, the incentive is limited to medium and large employers, with small 
employers paying the maximum premium. This range is defined as: 
 
(5.5)  pmax  –  pmin  <  d jt   <  pmax  –  pmin 
 
with pmin and  pmax denoting the minimum and maximum premium for employers with small 
employer size, and pmin and  pmax for minimum and maximum premium for employers with 




22 Note that the implicit assumption is that f well proxies employer specific effects in our model. 
23 From 2000–2002, the support increased from 1.96 to 2.80%. For example, in 2002 pmin and pmax were equal to 1.24% and 
6.06%, and pmin and pmax were set at 0.45% and 8.08%. Thus, the premium range with different marginal incentives for 
employers with small employer size and those with medium and large employer size was 4.82% (6.06–1.24) < .. < 7.63% 
(8.08–0.45).   
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Table 5.1 presents the Maximum Likelihood estimation results of the Grouped Logit model
24 
for equation (5.3), for 2000, 2001 and 2002. When looking at the sectoral dummies, we find the 
DI inflow to be highest in the primary sector (i.e. the reference sector) and for temporary 
employment agencies, whereas the inflow is lowest in the financial sector. For the other sectors, 
the relative position seems to change over the years. For the wage sum variable, we also find 
coefficients to change over the years. In particular, for 2000 the DI inflow probability increases 
with respect to the average wage sum. This can be explained by the relative attractiveness of the 
DI program for workers with high wages – DI benefits are based on the last earned wage – as 
well as the fact that part time workers have a lower DI risk. This picture fades out when looking 
at 2001 and 2002, which may be due to the setup of the data: as we have a panel of employers 
that are observed for three consecutive years, the number of employers with a low wage sum 
and small employer size decreases considerably. Employers performing poorly – employing 
less workers and paying lower wages over time – sort into the reference group. It may well be 
that this group of employers is more inclined to use the DI program as a substitute for the UI 
program. This also explains the changing pattern in the coefficient estimates describing the 
effect of employer size. 
 
Age and gender seem to be most important in explaining the inflow into DI. On average, the DI 
probability is somewhat higher for female workers. Remarkably, the inflow probability seems 
to be hump-shaped function of age. This suggests that sorting effects are important here – that 




24 STATA is used for the estimation of the model. In particular, we use the blogit command. Although the DI risk is 
expressed in terms of individual workers, all explanatory variables of X are measured at the level of employers – otherwise 
the data could not be grouped according to this level. As worker data are grouped according to employers (with employer 
size N ), the model is estimated by Grouped Logit estimation. In the pooled estimation (section 5.4) we use the cluster option 
in STATA as well, so as to combine yearly observations of employers and obtain robust standard errors.  
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Table 5.1    Grouped Logit estimates on cross sectional data (standard errors between parentheses) 
               2000              2001               2002 
             
Log likelihood   ￿ 330625.1  (N=5181149)  ￿ 379935.3  (N=5470778)  ￿ 352624.8  (N=5462871) 
             
Constant  ￿ 5.84  (0.093)  – 5.87  (0.080)  – 6.34  (0.077) 
Industrial sector  ￿ 0.28  (0.036)  – 0.31  (0.035)  – 0.25  (0.034) 
Trade sector  ￿ 0.42  (0.037)  – 0.42  (0.035)  – 0.34  (0.035) 
Service industries  ￿ 0.12  (0.039)  – 0.38  (0.038)  – 0.51  (0.038) 
Transport   ￿ 0.30  (0.039)  – 0.25  (0.038)  – 0.22  (0.038) 
Catering  – 0.36  (0.044)  – 0.37  (0.043)  – 0.40  (0.043) 
Social services / cultural  – 0.18  (0.038)  – 0.48  (0.037)  – 0.48  (0.037) 
Semi-public  – 0.35  (0.038)  – 0.29  (0.036)  – 0.42  (0.036) 
Financial sector  – 0.53  (0.038)  – 0.47  (0.037)  – 0.39  (0.037) 
Temp. empl. agencies  0.18  (0.038)  0.049  (0.038)  0.27  (0.038) 
Public sector  – 0.37  (0.043)  – 0.31  (0.040)  – 0.53  (0.042) 
Sector Unknown  – 0.076  (0.058)  – 0.11  (0.055)  – 0.15  ((0.055) 
             
10000 < wage < 20000  0.37  (0.025)  0.23  (0.023)  0.031  (0.024) 
20000 < wage < 30000  0.40  (0.023)  0.39  (0.021)  0.21  (0.023) 
30000 < wage < 40000  0.46  (0.023)  0.38  (0.022)  0.11  (0.023) 
40000 < wage < 50000  0.47  (0.024)  0.38  (0.022)  0.035  (0.024) 
50000 < wage < 60000  0.47  (0.025)  0.30  (0.023)  0.0060  (0.024) 
60000 < wage < 70000  0.34  (0.028)  0.22  (0.026)  – 0.11  (0.028) 
Wage > 70000  0.82  (0.032)  0.32  (0.030)  – 0.0094  (0.032) 
             
15 < N ≤ 25  0.022  (0.027)  0.037  (0.028)  – 0.37  (0.027) 
25 < N ≤ 50  0.013  (0.025)  0.048  (0.027)  – 0.47  (0.025) 
50 < N ≤ 100  0.091  (0.025)  0.12  (0.027)  – 0.52  (0.024) 
100 < N ≤ 250  0.13  (0.025)  0.18  (0.026)  – 0.57  (0.024) 
250 < N ≤ 1000  0.13  (0.025)  0.22  (0.026)  – 0.53  (0.023) 
N > 1000  0.071  (0.050)  0.25  (0.026)  – 0.47  (0.023) 
             
% male, 25-35   0.95  (0.085)  0.98  (0.085)  1.13  (0.092) 
% male, 35-45   1.40  (0.084)  1.79  (0.081)  1.93  (0.084) 
% male, 45-55  1.17  (0.091)  1.89  (0.088)  2.02  (0.089) 
% male, 55-65  0.23  (0.14)  0.67  (0.13)  1.68  (0.12) 
% female, 15-25   0.20  (0.092)  0.26  (0.090)  0.56  (0.094) 
% female, 25-35   1.53  (0.074)  1.65  (0.074)  1.77  (0.078) 
% female, 35-45   1.21  (0.097)  1.56  (0.10)  1.98  (0.098) 
% female, 45-55  2.10  (0.11)  2.07  (0.10)  1.52  (0.10) 
% female, 55-65  0.31  (0.22)  1.22  (0.20)  1.81  (0.18) 
             
I ( p < p max )  0.096  (0.065)  – 0.081  (0.044)  – 0.20  (0.031) 
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In the estimation of the model, we have extended the number of polynomials in the spline 
function to a maximum of eight.
25 The inclusion of this spline function affects our estimate of 
the incentive coefficient substantially – indicating the size of the estimation bias that would 
occur otherwise. In particular, without the spline function we find the coefficient estimate to 
equal –1.03 (0.023) for 2002, whereas including polynomials results in a coefficient estimate of 
– 0.20 (0.031). Thus, including f helps us to correct for substantial estimation biases – 
concentrating on the employers with a premium rate that lies in the support that is defined by 
equation (5.2). In this respect, note that the control group in this range – existing of employers 
with small employer size – is very limited. In 2000, this group contains only about 3,000 
individuals working for 175 employers, as opposed to a treatment group – employers with 
medium and large employer size – of about 23,0000 individuals (working for 2,500 employers). 
This is also reflected in the relatively large size of the standard error of the incentive coefficient 
for 2000. We only find the impact of experience rating to be significant for 2002.
26 This 
suggests that either the experience rating has only led to a substantial reduction in the inflow 
into DI in 2002, or that the incentive effect has gradually increased over time. 
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25 Higher order terms did not result in a substantial improvement of the fit of the model.  
26 In that year, the number workers in the treatment and control group has increased to about 6500 and 260000 workers, 
respectively.  
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Figure 5.1 illustrates the estimated impact of the (ex ante) experience rating incentive in 2002, 
averaged over all workers in the sample. The dotted line shows the premium schedule for 
employers with small employers’ size, as opposed to the premium schedule of employers with 
medium and large employer size. For 4.82% < d < 7.63% these schedules do not intersect. Here, 
the incentive for employers with small employer size is equal to zero, resulting in an inflow 
probability effect of 22%. This corresponds to an increase in the DI inflow probability of 0.2%-
point. 
 
Clearly, our estimation strategy helps us in correcting for substantial endogeneity biases. 
However, when interpreting our results we have to be aware of two (implicit) assumptions that 
have been made so far. First, our estimation strategy strongly relies on the local linearity 
assumption. We have argued earlier that this assumption is probably too restrictive in the 
context of the DI program in the Netherlands. Within the relevant time horizon of five years, 
employers are likely to move along the premium schedule. This means the marginal incentive 
will only gradually decrease with respect to the disability risk percentage, rather than being an 
all-or-nothing condition. Thus, we may expect possible incentive effects to be picked up by the 
spline function. The second (implicit) assumption that underlies our relates to the specification 
of the incentive effect. We assume this effect to be equal for all employers, irrespective of the 
number of employees. Thus the difference in the DI probability in the support of equation (5.2) 
can be fully attributed to the experience rating incentive. This assumption may be too restrictive 
if there are economies of scale in preventative activities. 
 
If both assumptions are not valid, the question arises how we then should interpret our results. 
Suppose the incentive decreases only gradually, and is virtually complete for all types of 
employers with p < pmax  – also including employers with small employer size. Then, if the 
incentive effect is equal for all types of employers, we would expect the coefficient estimate of 
γ  to be equal to zero. This means that γ is informative on the relative effectiveness of the 
experience rating incentive of employers with large employer size, compared to those with 
small employer size. The coefficient estimate of – 0.20 for 2002 thus implies that the incentive 
effect is higher for employers with medium and large employer size.  
  32 
5.4  Panel model estimation results 
The advantage of the first estimation strategy is that only cross sectional data are needed to 
estimate the effect of experience rating. However, identification of the model strongly relies on 
the local linearity assumption, and – despite the size of the data set – only a few observations 
can actually be used to identify the incentive effect. The second estimation strategy – exploiting 
the panel character of the data – is less susceptible to these problems.  
 
Within the context of panel data models, a number of techniques can be used to account for 
individual (employer) specific effects. Anderson and Meyer (1994) use a linear probability 
model, because of their large sample size and the large number of explanatory variables they 
use – enabling them to obtain first difference estimates of the effect of experience rating. For 
our model such an approach is less appealing, as the DI risk is only small and the number of 
time variant explanatory variables in our data is limited.
27 As an alternative, and as suggested 
by Mundlak (1978), we therefore pool the data from 2000–2002 and include the average values 
of X as explanatory variables in our model. The intuition behind this approach is that – by 
including averages – the effect of changing X is estimated, holding the time average fixed. For 
the parameter describing the impact of experience rating, we allow this effect to be 
asymmetric.
28 This means that we rewrite equation (5.2) into: 
 
           exp [ X jt β  + αuv + ∆uv I (t = 2001) +  ∆’uv I (t = 2002)]  
(5.6)     Pr ( DIjt  =  1 )   =  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
         1 + exp [ X jt β + αuv + ∆uv I (t = 2001) + ∆’uv I (t = 2002)]  
 
with 
   




(5.8)  vj   =  I ( pj, t=2001   >  pmin, j, t=2001 )   
 
uj and vj are indicator dummies that are equal to one if employer j pays a premium exceeding 
the minimum premium in 2000 and 2001, respectively. The combination of uj and vj results in 
 
27 We also have estimated the DI inflow using a linear probability model. For the cross sectional data, this resulted in similar 
estimation results as for the Logit (and Probit) model, but the results differed substantially when applying first difference 
estimation on the combined (panel) data. 
28 We also could have used Random Effects Probit or Logit model. However, given the size of our data, the estimation of 
such models is too cumbersome and time consuming. As is shown by Mundlak (1978), the estimated parameters of pooled 
estimation give very similar results, provided that the average values of time varying parameters are included as explanatory 
variables and that a robust variance matrix is used to account for within-employer variation.   
  33 
four employer categories for which α , ∆ and ∆’ are allowed to vary. As a reference group, we 
take employers that have paid the minimum premium in both years, thus having {uj = 0 , vj = 0}. 
Obviously, we would expect the DI inflow probability to be higher for employers for which uj = 
1 and/or vj =1, as employers with high α are more likely to have disability costs. Thus, αuv can 
be interpreted as the mean employer specific effect for employers. Thus, the assumption here is 
that including αuv eliminates the correlation between the employer specific effect and the 
incentive measure. In this respect, the parameter values of ∆ and ∆’ that denote the change in 
the DI inflow probability for 2001 and 2002, can be interpreted as difference-in-difference 
estimates of the (ex post) effect of experience rating.  
Table 5.2    Baseline parameter values for the employer categories for 2000-2002 
  2000  2001  2002 
       
u = 0, v = 0  0   ∆2001-2000  ∆2002-2000 
u = 0, v = 1  α01  α01 + ∆2001-2000 + ∆01  α01 + ∆2002-2000 + ∆’01 
u = 1, v = 0  α10  α10 + ∆2001-2000 + ∆10  α10 + ∆2002-2000 + ∆’10 
u = 1, v = 1  α11  α11 + ∆2001-2000 + ∆11  α11 + ∆2002-2000 + ∆’11 
 
Table 5.2 presents the baseline values of the DI inflow probability of the four employer groups 
for 2000-2002, where the baseline is normalised to zero for {u = 0, v = 0} in 2000. We take {u 
= 0, v = 0} as reference group for all years, with ∆2001-2000 and ∆2002-2000 as the respective time 
trend dummies. Difference-in-difference estimation follows from the comparison of ∆ and ∆’ 
between the employer groups. In particular, under the null hypothesis that there is no impact of 
ex post incentives of the experience rating system, we would expect ∆01 and ∆01’ to be equal to 
zero.  
 
In our estimation strategy we take advantage of the fact that past inflow into DI only affects the 
premium rate with a lag of two years. The intuition behind this is as follows. Suppose that an 
employer has no relevant DI recipients until 1998, but in 1999 one or more workers in fact do 
enter into the DI scheme. Due to the two-year time delay, the premium rate increase occurs in 
2001. The ex post effect then follows from the comparison of the DI inflow between 2001 and 
2000, as well as 2002 and 2000. Obviously, this is likely to result in a substantial estimation 
biases if, for example, the time delay of the experience rating system would be equal to one 
year.  
 
Table 5.3 shows the estimated parameter coefficients that result from the difference-in-
difference strategy, using equation (5.6). To start with, it should be noted that employer specific 
effects indeed are important. Due to the inclusion of average values of the worker composition 
variables, the parameter estimates describing the impact of age and gender change substantially. 
In particular, we find the DI probability to increase with age for almost all age categories –  
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whereas the pattern was hump-shaped according to our earlier estimates. This suggests that 
older workers sort into jobs with low DI risks. The importance of unobserved employer specific 
effects is also mirrored by the coefficient estimates of α. Employers with high DI risks will sort 
into α01 , α11 and α10. Not surprisingly, we find the estimate of α11 to be the highest, whereas the 
DI inflow is lowest for the reference group of employers paying the minimum premium in 2000 
and 2001.  
 
When looking at the difference-in-difference estimates, we see that the time trends differ 
substantially between employer categories. To start with, we find the inflow into DI to have 
increased in 2001 with about 17%, and stabilised in 2002. For the other groups, this upward 
trend is less prominent, or even in the opposite direction. In particular, the increase in the DI 
inflow rate of employers that experience a rise in their premium rate in 2001 is about 4% lower 
than the reference group in 2001, and about 15% lower in 2002 (with a coefficient of – 0.16 
(0.021)
29). This suggests that ex post incentives of the experience rating system are important. 
Apparently, premium rate increases are unanticipated by employers – making them (more) 
aware of the experience rate incentives, and triggering them to increase preventative activities.
30 
As such activities take time to become effective, it is not surprising that the incentive effect is 
found to be increasing over time.  
 
29 This implies that, comparing 2000 and 2002, the DI inflow probability has remained constant for this group. 
30 The finding that employers – in particular those with small employer size – are not or only partially aware of the 
experience rating system is in line with Besseling et al. (1999).  
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 Table 5.3                  Grouped logit estimates on panel data (standard errors between parentheses), Part 1 
  Total DI inflow    Partial disability  Full disability 
             
Log likelihood   –1070818.6  (N=16114420)  – 538545.5    – 660922.6   
             
Constant  – 6.03  (0.041)  – 7.49  (0.072)  – 6.26  (0.050) 
Industrial sector  – 0.28  (0.020)  – 0.15            (0.034)  – 0.35  (0.025) 
Trade sector  – 0.45  (0.021)  – 0.40  (0.036)  – 0.46  (0.025) 
Service industries  – 0.22  (0.022)  – 0.55  (0.040)  – 0.12  (0.027) 
Transport   – 0.30  (0.022)  – 0.026  (0.036)  – 0.49  (0.028) 
Catering  – 0.37  (0.025)  – 0.24  (0.044)  – 0.43  (0.030) 
Social services / cultural  – 0.40  (0.021)  – 0.045  (0.036)  – 0.58  (0.026) 
Semi-public  – 0.37  (0.021)  0.0085  (0.036)  – 0.69  (0.027) 
Financial sector  – 0.53   (0.021)  – 0.32  (0.036)  – 0.63  (0.027) 
Temp. empl. agencies  0.29  (0.022)  – 0.15  (0.040)  0.42  (0.026) 
Public sector  – 0.50  (0.024)  – 0.18  (0.038)  – 0.81  (0.032) 
Sector Unknown  – 0.081  (0.032)  – 0.025  (0.052)  – 0.084  (0.041) 
             
10000 < wage < 20000  0.28  (0.014)  0.14  (0.028)  0.28  (0.016) 
20000 < wage < 30000  0.40  (0.013)  0.52  (0.023)  0.33  (0.015) 
30000 < wage < 40000  0.31  (0.013)  0.60  (0.022)  0.15  (0.016) 
40000 < wage < 50000  0.26  (0.013)  0.66  (0.022)  – 0.029  (0.017) 
50000 < wage < 60000  0.20  (0.013)  0.67  (0.022)  – 0.17  (0.018) 
60000 < wage < 70000  0.058  (0.015)  0.50  (0.024)  – 0.30  (0.020) 
Wage > 70000  0.30  (0.018)  0.70  (0.028)  – 0.0017  (0.024) 
             
N > 15  – 0.070  (0.016)  – 0.063  (0.025)  – 0.069  (0.020) 
25 < N ≤ 50  – 0.10  (0.015)  – 0.11  (0.023)  – 0.095  (0.019) 
50 < N ≤ 100  – 0.090  (0.015)  – 0.087  (0.023)  – 0.086  (0.019) 
100 < N ≤ 250  – 0.0091  (0.014)  – 0.064  (0.023)  – 0.11  (0.019) 
250 < N ≤ 1000  – 0.085  (0.014)  – 0.027  (0.022)  – 0.13  (0.019) 
N > 1000  – 0.096  (0.014)  – 0.0036  (0.022)  – 0.17  (0.019) 
             
% male, 25-35  1.00  (0.13)  0.77  (0.22)  1.09  (0.17) 
% male, 35-45  0.96  (0.14)  0.47  (0.22)  1.17  (0.17) 
% male, 45-55   1.25  (0.14)  1.45  (0.22)  0.85  (0.18) 
% male, 55-65   1.27  (0.17)  0.99  (0.25)  1.66  (0.23) 
% female, 15-25   0.31  (0.16)  – 0.32  (0.28)  0.52  (0.20) 
% female, 25-35  0.88  (0.14)  1.02  (0.22)  0.75  (0.18) 
% female, 35-45   0.65  (0.14)  0.80  (0.22)  0.41  (0.18) 
% female, 45-55  1.73  (0.15)  1.75  (0.23)  1.65  (0.19) 
% female, 55-65  2.20  (0.24)  1.35  (0.36)  2.65  (0.32) 
             
% male–mean, 25-35   – 0.012  (0.14)  0.19  (0.23)  0.073  (0.18) 
% male–mean, 35-45  1.11  (0.14)  1.67  (0.23)  0.92  (0.18) 
% male–mean, 45-55   0.49  (0.15)  0.92  (0.23)  0.40  (0.19) 
% male–mean, 55-65   – 0.088  (0.17)  0.022  (0.26)  – 0.25  (0.24) 
% female–mean, 15-25   0.13  (0.17)  0.079  (0.29)  0.17  (0.21) 
% female–mean, 25-35  0.77  (0.15)  0.68  (0.23)  0.91  (0.19) 
% female–mean, 35-45   1.23  (0.15)  1.15  (0.24)  1.39  (0.19) 
% female–mean, 45-55  0.66  (0.15)  0.67  (0.24)  0.77  (0.20) 
% female–mean, 55-65  – 0.82  (0.26)  – 0.58  (0.39)  – 0.91  (0.34) 
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Table 5.3         Grouped Logit estimates on panel data (standard errors between parentheses), Part 2 
        Total DI inflow           Partial disability  Full disability 
             
Year = 2001   0.17  (0.015)  0.34  (0.023)  0.051  (0.020) 
Year = 2002  0.17  (0.015)  0.30  (0.024)  0.077  (0.020) 
             
Average in 2000             
α01  0.31  (0.016)  0.23  (0.024)  0.39  (0.020) 
α11  0.47  (0.013)  0.35  (0.020)  0.55  (0.016) 
α10  0.18  (0.022)  0.26  (0.032)  0.12  (0.031) 
             
Difference estimator 2000 – 2001           
∆01  – 0.044  (0.021)  – 0.067  (0.031)  – 0.068  (0.028) 
∆11  – 0.14  (0.017)  – 0.14  (0.026)  – 0.14  (0.022) 
∆10  – 0.011  (0.032)  0.038  (0.042)  – 0.017  (0.046) 
             
Difference estimator 2000 – 2002           
∆’01  – 0.16  (0.021)  – 0.17  (0.032)  – 0.19  (0.028) 
∆’11  – 0.25  (0.017)  – 0.21  (0.026)  – 0.28  (0.022) 
∆’10   – 0.26  (0.032)  – 0.24  (0.044)  – 0.35  (0.048) 
 
Remarkably, we find the difference estimates for employers with DI costs in 2000 even to 
exceed that of employers no longer paying the uniform minimum premium in 2001. The 
estimated coefficients for these groups are equal to – 0.25 (0.017) and – 0.26 (0.032). However, 
when interpreting this result, one should be aware that in the time period under consideration, 
the experience rating system was introduced only recently. If the experience rating system has 
triggered employers to increase preventative activities, it is likely that these have become 
effective over time, explaining the decrease in the DI probability in 2000–2002. Still, caution is 
needed for such an interpretation, as there may be other factors explaining the decrease of the 
DI risk for these particular groups.  
 
Table 5.3 also presents estimation results for the separate inflow into partial and full DI 
schemes. The picture that emerges is that the relative importance of both schemes differs 
substantially across sectors, as well as employer and worker types. Most strikingly, the inflow 
probability into partial DI schemes clearly increases with respect to the average wage sum of an 
employer, whereas the opposite holds for the inflow into full disability. This can be explained 
by the fact that the degree of disability is based on the residual earnings capacity of workers, 
compared to the minimum wage. As low wage workers are more likely to have an earnings 
capacity that is lower than the minimum wage, they are more likely to enter into the full DI 
scheme.  
 
Similar as for the total inflow into the DI schemes, we find substantial ex post effects of 
experience rating – measured by the difference-in-difference estimators ∆01 and ∆’01 . For both 
schemes we find a similar effect of experience rating, at about 15% after one year. This 
suggests that either the inflow into full disability are equally susceptible to moral hazard  
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problems, and/or that part of the former inflow has been shifted to the partial DI scheme – i.e. 
that both schemes are substitute pathways. In both cases, restricting the experience rating to the 
partial DI scheme is not a wise thing to do.  
5.5  Robustness tests and model extensions 
5.5.1  Serial correlation 
So far, the outcomes of the difference-in-difference approach have been subject to a number of 
specifying assumptions. In particular, we have adopted a Logit specification and assumed the 
inflow into DI to be serially uncorrelated. We have re-estimated the model using various 
alternative estimation methods, so as to test for the potentially biasing impact of these 
assumptions. To start with, an obvious robust test was to re-estimate the model using a Probit 
specification. This resulted in very similar average derivatives of the parameter estimates. We 
also have addressed the potential bias impact through serial correlation. To clarify this issue, let 
us look at two moment restrictions that are needed for the identification of the immediate 
experience rating effect in 2001 and the one-year-effect in 2002, respectively: 
 




(5.11)    E [ vj ( εij, t+2 – εijt ) ]  =   0 
 
These moment conditions state that the probability of a premium increase in 2001is 
uncorrelated with changes in the error term. We know that vj  is a function of the past inflow 
into the DI program. Due to the delay of two years, and under the assumption that there is no 
serial correlation, there is no estimation bias. However, if there is serial correlation between εijt 
and εij, t-1 , then, using a first order Taylor approximation of vj with respect to εij,t-1 it can be 
shown that the estimated effect will be biased: 
 
                     ∂ vj   
(5.12)    E [  vj ( εijt+1  – εijt  ) ]  =   E    ––––    σε
2  (  ρ
2 – ρ )   
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                     ∂ vj   
(5.13)    E [  vj ( εij,t+2  – εijt  ) ]  =   E    ––––    σε
2  (  ρ
3 – ρ )   
                           ∂ εij,t-1 
 
where ρ is the degree of serial correlation of εijt . 
 
To test for the presence of serial correlation, we have calculated the degree of (serial) 
correlation between the first differences of the estimation residuals of equation (5.6). This 
resulted in a coefficient estimate of 0.065. What this suggests is that (positive) serial correlation 
declines over time considerably, and the expected (negative) bias is virtually equal for the effect 
in 2001 and 2002 (since ρ
3 ≈  ρ
2 ). We do not find such a pattern to be supported by the 
estimation results. In particular, the immediate effect of experience rating is insignificant, 
whereas the effect is substantial after one year. From this we conclude that the biasing impact 
serial correlation is not substantial. 
5.5.2  Model extensions 
Our results indicate that ex post incentive effects of experience rating are important – i.e. 
employers are triggered to increase preventative activities, once they have experienced 
(unanticipated) increases in their premiums. It is interesting to see whether this result varies 
across employer types and alternative incentive measures. First, one may argue that the impact 
of experience rating is larger for employers with high wage sum growth rates, paying more than 
100% of additional DI costs. To test for this, we have replaced the incentive indicators ∆01 and 
∆’01 by the marginal incentive measures, where account is taken of the employer-specific wage 
sums.
31 If employers respond to this more accurate incentive measure, rather than the mere fact 
of paying a premium that exceeds the minimum, this is likely to improve the fit of the model. 
The estimation results that follow from this approach – which are presented in the first column 
of Table 5.5 – indicate that this is not the case.
32 Therefore we conclude that the decision to 
increase preventative activities is mainly an issue of being aware of the experience rating 
system, rather than responding in line with more accurate measures of financial incentives. 
 
Second, we have extended the model by allowing for difference-in-difference estimates for 
employers that have paid the maximum premium in 2000-2001. If ex ante incentives are 
important, we expect employers that start paying the maximum premium in 2001 – having no 
(marginal) incentive to prevent further DI inflow – to have a higher DI inflow in 2002. In terms 
of the parameter coefficients in the second column of Table 5.4, this means that we expect ∆11 <  
∆12  and ∆’11 <  ∆’12. In a similar vein, we expect the reverse to hold for employers that no 
 
31 See Section 4.3 for this. 
32 We also re-estimated the model with both the indicator dummy and the more precise marginal incentive measure. The 
coefficient estimate for the two-year impact of the dummy indicator was equal to – 0.16 (0.021), whereas the impact of the 
other measure was not found to be significant.    
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longer pay the maximum premium in 2001: ∆22 > ∆21 and ∆’22 > ∆’21. When looking at the 
parameter estimates, we find all four hypotheses not to be supported by the data. This suggests 
that incompleteness of the experience rating system due to the maximum premium does not 
affect the behaviour of employers. Moreover, and in contrast to this, in some cases there is 
weak evidence of the opposite effect to hold. For example, employers that start paying the 
maximum premium in 2001 are found to have a parameter estimate of – 0.35 (0.043) for 2002, 
compared to an estimate of – 0.26 (0.017) of the (control) group that continued paying a 
premium rate below the maximum. 
 
Finally, the third column of Table 5.4 shows that the estimated impact of experience rating is 
only significant for employers with more than 25 workers – in particular with a delay of two 
years.
33Apparently, economies of scale are important here, lending credence to the idea that the 
degree of experience rating should be lower for small employers. In a way, this also confirms 
our earlier finding that resulted from the first estimation strategy – using cross sectional data 
only. When interpreting these results, we concluded that our estimates were informative on the 
relative effectiveness of the experience rating incentive of employers with large employer size 
(with an coefficient estimate of – 0.20). Identification of this effect follows from the 
comparison of these groups over a range of disability risks where both groups have similar 
incentives.  
 
33 We also re-estimated the model, allowing the effect of experience rating to differ between sectors. For most sectors, the 
estimated effect corresponded to the average impact of about 16% (after two years). We only found the impact to be 
relatively low in the trade sector and the social services sector.  
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Table 5.4  Grouped Logit estimates of panel model variants (standard errors between parentheses), Part 1 
               Model (i)             Model (ii)               Model (iii) 
             
Log likelihood   –1070826.8  N=16114420  – 1070521.3    – 1070810.8   
             
Constant  – 6.03  (0.041)  – 6.09  (0.041)  – 6.04  (0.041) 
Industrial sector  – 0.28  (0.020)  – 0.28  (0.020)  – 0.28  (0.020) 
Trade sector  – 0.45  (0.021)  – 0.45  (0.021)  – 0.45  (0.021) 
Service industries  – 0.22  (0.022)  – 0.22  (0.022)  – 0.22  (0.022) 
Transport   – 0.30  (0.022)  – 0.29  (0.022)  – 0.30  (0.022) 
Catering  – 0.37  (0.025)  – 0.37  (0.025)  – 0.37  (0.025) 
Social services / cultural  – 0.39  (0.021)  – 0.39  (0.021)  – 0.40  (0.021) 
Semi-public  – 0.37  (0.021)  – 0.40  (0.021)  – 0.37  (0.021) 
Financial sector  – 0.53   (0.021)  – 0.53   (0.021)  – 0.53   (0.021) 
Temp. empl. agencies  0.29  (0.022)  0.30  (0.021)  0.29  (0.022) 
Public sector  – 0.50  (0.024)  – 0.51  (0.024)  – 0.50  (0.024) 
Sector Unknown  – 0.079  (0.032)  – 0.079  (0.032)  – 0.081  (0.032) 
             
10000 < wage < 20000  0.28  (0.014)  0.30  (0.014)  0.28  (0.014) 
20000 < wage < 30000  0.40  (0.013)  0.42  (0.013)  0.40  (0.013) 
30000 < wage < 40000  0.31  (0.013)  0.35  (0.013)  0.31  (0.013) 
40000 < wage < 50000  0.26  (0.013)  0.30  (0.013)  0.26  (0.013) 
50000 < wage < 60000  0.20  (0.014)  0.25  (0.014)  0.20  (0.014) 
60000 < wage < 70000  0.060  (0.015)  0.10  (0.015)  0.058  (0.015) 
Wage > 70000  0.30  (0.018)  0.34  (0.018)  0.30  (0.018) 
             
N > 15  – 0.069  (0.016)  – 0.044  (0.016)  – 0.070  (0.016) 
25 < N ≤ 50  – 0.10  (0.015)  – 0.061  (0.015)  – 0.098  (0.015) 
50 < N ≤ 100  – 0.088  (0.015)  – 0.032  (0.015)  – 0.083  (0.015) 
100 < N ≤ 250  – 0.089  (0.015)  – 0.026  (0.015)  – 0.085  (0.015) 
250 < N ≤ 1000  – 0.084  (0.014)  – 0.016  (0.015)  – 0.079  (0.015) 
N > 1000  – 0.095  (0.014)  – 0.024  (0.014)  – 0.090  (0.014) 
             
% male, 25-35  0.99  (0.13)  1.03  (0.13)  1.00  (0.13) 
% male, 35-45  0.94  (0.14)  0.95  (0.14)  0.96  (0.14) 
% male, 45-55   1.24  (0.14)  1.24  (0.14)  1.25  (0.14) 
% male, 55-65   1.26  (0.17)  1.36  (0.16)  1.27  (0.17) 
% female, 15-25   0.29  (0.16)  0.37  (0.16)  0.31  (0.16) 
% female, 25-35  0.87  (0.14)  0.92  (0.14)  0.88  (0.14) 
% female, 35-45   0.64  (0.14)  0.70  (0.14)  0.66  (0.14) 
% female, 45-55  1.72  (0.15)  1.73  (0.15)  1.73  (0.14) 
% female, 55-65  2.19  (0.24)  2.36  (0.24)  2.20  (0.24) 
             
% male–mean, 25-35   0.020  (0.14)  – 0.037  (0.14)  0.015  (0.14) 
% male–mean, 35-45  1.12  (0.14)  1.083  (0.14)  1.10  (0.14) 
% male–mean, 45-55   0.50  (0.15)  0.49  (0.15)  0.49  (0.15) 
% male–mean, 55-65   – 0.082  (0.17)  – 0.20  (0.17)  – 0.088  (0.17) 
% female–mean, 15-25   0.15  (0.17)  0.058  (0.17)  0.13  (0.17) 
% female–mean, 25-35  0.78  (0.15)  0.72  (0.15)  0.77  (0.15) 
% female–mean, 35-45   1.25  (0.15)  1.19  (0.15)  1.23  (0.15) 
% female–mean, 45-55  0.67  (0.15)  0.64  (0.15)  0.66  (0.15) 
% female–mean, 55-65  – 0.81  (0.26)  – 1.04  (0.25)  – 0.82  (0.26)  
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Table 5.4   Grouped Logit estimates of panel model variants (standard errors between parentheses), Part 2 
                  Model (i)                 Model (ii)                  Model (iii) 
             
             
Year = 2001   0.17  (0.014)  0.17  (0.015)  0.17  (0.015) 
Year = 2002  0.15  (0.014)  0.17  (0.015)  0.17  (0.015) 
             
Average in 2000             
α01  0.30  (0.012)  0.27  (0.016)  0.30  (0.016) 
α11  0.46  (0.012)  0.42  (0.013)  0.46  (0.013) 
α10  0.18  (0.021)  0.16  (0.023)  0.19  (0.022) 
α12      0.81  (0.029)     
α22      0.71  (0.030)     
α21      0.54  (0.034)     
             
Difference estimator 2000 – 2001           
∆01  – 0.052  (0.019)  – 0.036  (0.021)  – 0.078  (0.045) 
∆01  x   I( N > 25)           0.036  (0.042) 
∆11          – 0.14  (0.016)  – 0.13  (0.017)  – 0.14  (0.017) 
∆10  – 0.0078  (0.032)  0.0053  (0.033)  0.011  (0.032) 
∆12      – 0.23  (0.044)     
∆22      – 0.24  (0.043)     
∆21      – 0.16  (0.045)     
             
Difference estimator 2000 – 2002           
∆’01  – 0.14  (0.020)  – 0.16  (0.021)  – 0.020  (0.042) 
∆’01  x   I( N > 25)            – 0.16  (0.040) 
∆’11        – 0.24  (0.016)  – 0.26  (0.017)  – 0.26  (0.017) 
∆’10  – 0.24  (0.032)  – 0.25  (0.033)  – 0.26  (0.032) 
∆’12      – 0.35  (0.043)     
∆’22      – 0.30  (0.044)     
∆’21      – 0.18  (0.045)     
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6  Conclusions 
The overall picture that emerges from our empirical analysis is that the impact of experience 
rating on DI inflow is substantial. This is in accordance with findings in other international 
studies. Our results are also in line with more general findings for the Netherlands indicating 
that there is room for employers to reduce the use of sickness and DI arrangements. It is striking 
to find that the decision of employers to increase preventative activities seems mainly an issue 
of being aware of the experience rating incentive. In the time period under consideration, it 
seems that the awareness of employers of the experience rating system was limited – providing 
us with the key ingredient of our difference-in-difference approach. Employers seem to have 
been triggered to increase their preventative activities (‘ex post incentives’), once they have 
experienced (substantial) increases in their premium rates. Apparently, employers were not well 
informed, either on the experience rating system – which in a way is not surprising, when 
looking at its complexity – or on the nature and the size of the disability risk.  
 
We have estimated the ex post effect of the experience rating system to amount to a 15% 
reduction in the DI inflow after one year. We have shown that this finding is robust with respect 
to various specification alternatives. In particular, we have found the potential bias through 
serial correlation in DI risks to be unimportant. Other robustness tests confirm the idea that 
preventative activities are driven by ex post incentives, rather than responses that are in line 
with more accurate measures of financial incentives (ex ante incentives).  
 
When taking a policy perspective, there are a number of options that follow from our analysis. 
First, an obvious policy option is to increase the awareness of employers of the experience 
rating system. Similar to the analysis of Hyatt and Thomason (1998), employers seem to be less 
aware of the merits of experience rating – i.e. a gradual reduction in the premiums they pay, as 
long as there is no inflow into DI – than the disadvantages, once the premium increases occur. 
To increase the awareness of the experience rating system, one may think of the provision of 




Other policy options are related to the design of the experience rating system. From the 
perspective of stimulating preventative activities, restricting the experience rating incentive to 
partial DI schemes only does not seem a wise thing to do, as we find similar and substantial 
effects for the inflow into partial and full DI. In contrast to this, lowering the incentive for small 
employers – which in fact has been the case over the time period under consideration – is a 
 
34 As of 2003, the Dutch social benefit administration (UWV) has introduced such a system (see UWV, 2002b).   
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more obvious policy option, since we found no substantial impact of the incentive for 
employers with less than 25 workers. This suggests that economies of scale in preventative 
activities are important. 
 
All in all, our results point out the effectiveness of the DI experience rating system. Still, for a 
more comprehensive evaluation, we need to know what the effects are on the outflow of the DI 
scheme, as well as the consequences for the hiring behaviour of employers. Until now, the 
literature has largely ignored these issues, so these are important avenues for future research. 
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